A large frame quadrant at the Beijing Ancient Observatory, published public domain and copyright free.
Quadrant Diagrams
I’ve a soft spot for quadrant diagrams and have put them to use in various places over the years – for example, here, in Public History Weekly to think about the ‘institution’ and ‘destitution’ of pasts, and here to reflect on the ethics of historical identification.
Quadrant diagrams can be problematic, of course, if the terms they are made up of are polarized in a strictly binary manner. Furthermore, they are two-dimensional, giving positive and negative values on two axes, where the world is three-dimensional in space. Quadrant diagrams tend to the static also, since they denote logical contrasts, and they typically lack a fourth-dimensional element and a time that ticks.
It seems to me that they can have great value, however, as ways of working out the implications of a position or proposition, and in helping to scheme out alternatives. I’ve found that at leat four times in recent weeks, whilst reading, and I have found myself pencilling quadrants in the margins of books to help me think with (and against) their authors.
This post fleshes out the first of those scribbles in the context of an argument about history, responsibility and reparations for slavery. Parts 2-4 will look at arguments about aims in history education, arguments in Indian historiography, and, finally, the contrast between knowing (and not knowing) and believing (and not believing) histories.
It’s probable that quadrant diagrams are more valuable as things to break than as things to make and that their value is less to articualte binary concepts than to help test their limits and the limits of the conceptualisations we can build by combining binaries.
Legacy and Responsibility
I’ve been reading Thomas Harding’s White Debt: The Demerara uprising and Britain’s legacy of slavery (2022) on my early morning commute recently and finished it last week. Finished in the sense that I got to the end of the book, but not to the end of the issues it raises – linked to the topics it discusses and to the type of writing it embodies (what Megill calls ‘para-history’ (1)). I need to read it again and soon, to start exploring those issues with the care they deserve.
In his ‘Postscript’ Harding argues in support of the British paying reparatoins for slavery and says: ‘This is not about feeling guilty for what our ancestors did before we were born, it is about addressing the legacy of slavery that still impacts people today’ (Harding, 2022: 265). This sentence embeds a number of binaries, some of which explicitly contain both of the terms polarized and others in which only one term is explicitly present. An example of the former is the contrast between the ‘us’ whose ancestors’ actions are at stake, and those ancestors (‘them’); and, for example, between ‘feeling’ and ‘acting’ (my gloss on ‘addressing’). Examples of the latter include: the contrasts implied but not stated between the time of these ancestors (‘before we were born’) and our time; and between ‘us’ who will be doing the ‘addressing’ (through reparation) and those who will benefit from reparation, and who are still feeing the impacts of historic slavery now (a second ‘them’).
The diagram below tidies up what I scribbled in the margins on page 265 of my copy of Harding’s book, and focuses on the ‘us’ and the first ‘them’ in Harding’s text (‘our ancestors’), and on the contrast between ‘now’ and ‘then’. Perhaps it helps make explicit some possibilites that might be thought to be latent in Harding’s grammar.
Figure 1: History and responsibility, Schema 1
Quadrant 2 embodies the kind of responsibility that Harding doesn’t advocate, and, indeed, there may be good reasons for not setting this kind of responsibility out. The kind of claim that might be embodied in that quadrant seems absurd – in the sense of being inconsistent with conventional ideas about time and responsibility. ‘We’ didn’t ‘do’ these things – they took place before ‘we’ existed and ‘our’ intentions (and therefore scope for culpability) had no bearing on the outcome. What was done was done by ‘them’ and done ‘then.’
The kind of responsibility posited in Quadrant 2 remains absurd as long as we think individually (about the individuals who make up the ‘we’) or as long as we think in temporally-restricted ways (locating that ‘we’ solely in ‘our’ now in the twenty-first century). If the ‘we’ is a transcendant entity, bigger than and shaping individuals, such as a ‘family’, a nation, or a culture, however, then the apparent absurdity of holding agents in one time responsible for the actions of agents in another melts away. If ‘we’ is institutionalised (the ‘we’ of the British state, the Church of England, a family, and so on) then transcendance is factored in: that is a ‘we’ that is temporally extended across time, a corporate person that integrates individual people into itself and whose responsibilities, predicates and assets can transcend the limits of ‘our’ individual lives and stretch over centuries (2).
Quadrant 3 seems to isolate responsibility in the past also, insulating slavery and the perpetrators of slavery in the past – ‘what’ they did before we were born belongs ‘then’ and is effectively insulated from now (‘our’ present – the time in which ‘we’ can ‘act’ and be held responsible for acting).
Harding’s argument lives on the left hand side of the diagram – in Quadrants 4 and 1 and is interestingly unclear about exactly where it might sit. ‘People today’ are impacted by past action but even though Harding argues for ‘our’ responsibility ‘now,’ his form of words avoids explicitly identifying an agent responsible for these impacts. ‘Slavery’ is made responsible (through the use of the genitive ‘of’) for its ‘legacy,’ even though it is hard to see how we can thinkig of this ‘it’ as having intentions and as acting, and, therefore, as having responsibility.
A reformulation of the quadrant diagram can, perhaps, help, in turning apparent semantic possibilities and impossibilities into historical relationships and responsibilities.
Figure 2: History and responsibility, Schema 2
This forumulation introduces the arrow of time (the ‘now’/’then’ axis) and it introduces two arrows of causation, operating across time, leading from ‘them,’ here denoting slave-ownders, to ‘us.’ The arrow of causation is differentiated into two: one relating to an ‘us’ impacted negatively by the consequences of enslavement and exploitation (first and foremost captured Africans and their descendants) and the other relating to an ‘us’ impacted positively by those consequences (first and foremost families and institutions whose wealth now has roots in capital and other resources accumulated in the time of slavery) (2).
The question now becomes about relationships of responsibility and entitlement arising in the present between those who are the inheritors of positive and those who are the inheritors of negative distributions of material wealth and of poverty and of their cumulative impacts over time; between those who are the inheritors of positive and those who are the inheritors of negative positioning in cultures and ideologies originating in enslavemenet, and so on.
Talk of inheritance, of course, points to strutures: to interlocking matrices of institutions that enable and perpetuate distributions of resource (law courts, archives, and so on); and to ideologies, those interpersonal networks of discourses and frameworks of meaning and implication that evolve in time and that carry past conceptualisations into presents and futures.
Conclusion
Harding’s book is a very powerful and a very moving read and the project of researching and writing that it arises from was motivated, as Harding explains, by a sense of family responsibilty. The book succeeds in articulating history, responsibility and reparation graphically and very compellingly.
The marginalia on marginalia that I’ve elaborated here contribute very little by comparison. Nevertheless, scribbling, interrogating and tarrying with a quadrant diagram can, perhaps, help clarify some of the ways in which arrows of time and causalilty can help break down neat logical separations that can serve to help isolate and insulate both agency and responsibility and past and present.
References
(1) Allan Megill discusses para-history in the following 2002 review article – Megill, A. 2002. ‘Two para-historical approaches to atrocity’, History and Theory 41 (4): 104–23. For Megill, ‘para- historical’ enquiry mixes historical and moral questions (so that, for example, ‘who made it happen, who allowed it to happen?’ is no longer just an empirical question)
(2) The Trevelyan family, who recently made some reparation for what members of the family had done during the period of slavery explicitly framed things in collective terms – family responsibility (for example, here). One of the signal achievements of UCL’s Legacies of British Slavery project is to show how deeply slave holding was embedded in British society – contributing to the accumulation of wealth in families across the social spectrum.